University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Business - Economics Working
Papers

Faculty of Business and Law

January 2001

A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual Behaviour and the
Prevalence of AIDS
Amnon Levy
University of Wollongong, levy@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers

Recommended Citation
Levy, Amnon, A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual Behaviour and the Prevalence of AIDS,
Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, 2001.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers/35

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

University of Wollongong
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series 2001

A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual
Behaviour and the Prevalence of AIDS

Amnon Levy

WP 01-04

A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual Behavior
and
the Prevalence of AIDS

by
Amnon Levy

Abstract
A lifetime portfolio of risky and risk-free sexual activities is conceptually
constructed in this paper. People’s time allocation between risky and riskfree sexual activities affects, and is affected by, the prevalence of AIDS. A
small satisfaction differential between risky sex and risk-free sex can lead
to a significant prevalence of AIDS. Numerical simulations suggest that
the reduction in the prevalence of AIDS generated by a one percent
improvement in the sensual quality of freely distributed condoms can be
0.855 percent when the initial satisfaction differential between risky sex
and risk-free sex is 50 percent, or 0.464 percent when the initial
satisfaction differential is 100 percent. (JEL I19, J17, D91)

Author’s address: Professor Amnon Levy, Department of Economics, University of
Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
Author’s e-mail address: amnon_levy@uow.edu.au

A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual Behavior
and
the Prevalence of AIDS
A lifetime portfolio of risky and risk-free sexual activities is conceptually
constructed in this paper. People’s time allocation between risky and riskfree sexual activities affects, and is affected by, the prevalence of AIDS. A
small satisfaction differential between risky sex and risk-free sex can lead
to a significant prevalence of AIDS. Numerical simulations suggest that
the reduction in the prevalence of AIDS generated by a one percent
improvement in the sensual quality of freely distributed condoms can be
0.855 percent when the initial satisfaction differential between risky sex
and risk-free sex is 50 percent, or 0.464 percent when the initial
satisfaction differential is 100 percent. (JEL I19, J17, D91)

Since the eruption of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in June 1981
seventeen million sub-Saharan Africans succumbed to the disease. Twenty-five million
sub-Saharan Africans are currently infected with AIDS. For a population of half a billion
people these figures are staggering. The epidemic has not been confined to sub-Saharan
Africa. Eighteen million people have been infected with AIDS in the rest of the world, of
whom five millions have already died. In total, during the first twenty years of the
pandemic one percent of the world population (about the population of Great Britain) has
been infected with the AIDS virus and 0.37 percent (nearly the population of
Scandinavia) has succumbed to it. The level of devastation will be immensely increased
when the epidemic reaches a take-off stage in the heavily populated, poor and socially
and politically unstable central, southern and eastern regions of Asia. 1
Only five percent of the people currently infected with AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa are
identified. The rest, about twenty-four million, continue fuelling the epidemic in one of
the world’s poorest and socially and politically unstable regions. A severe identification
problem also exists in all the other parts of the world. While tests for AIDS can be
inexpensively provided, medical care is expensive. Twenty billion dollars are needed
every year for granting a proper medical care for the AIDS sufferers of sub-Saharan
Africa alone—about three times the nominal per capita income in that part of the world
for any infected person. In the absence of adequate private resources, strong governmental
1

commitment, coordination and funding, and massive international assistance, there is a
low incentive for the people of sub-Saharan Africa to participate in tests for AIDS.
Fearful of stigmatism and ostracism if tested positive, they avoid the tests. Even if the test
results were confidential, in the absence of significant help and medical care many may
prefer illusion to realisation. 2
Although the AIDS virus can also be transmitted from mother to fetus and by
contaminated blood transfusions and sharing of hypodermic needles, the present paper
focuses on the transmission of AIDS through sexual activity. People’s interest and
participation in sex exceed the level needed for reproduction and, despite the risk of
contracting AIDS, the marriage’s confines. The probability of contracting AIDS and the
prevalence of the disease can be limited by using a simple device—a condom. In
developed countries condoms can be bought in supermarkets for a few cents per unit, and
in many developing areas the distribution of condoms is highly subsidised. Yet condoms
are not always used in non-reproductive sexual activities and not necessarily due to a high
price (relative to income) and uncertain supply (Philipson and Posner, 1995). In view of
the costs of bearing the risk of contracting AIDS and that in many places condoms are
cheaply and steadily supplied, it must be the case that people derive considerably higher
level of satisfaction from sexual intercourse unrestrained by condoms.
Sexual intercourse restrained by condoms are considered in this paper to be risk-free. In
the absence of perfect information about the identity of those infected with AIDS and self
HIV-AIDS status, which is the case for many people, sub-Saharan Africans in particular,
unrestrained sex is considered to be risky. The transmission of AIDS through risky sexual
intercourse cannot be solely attributed to erratic and uncalculated behavior. Analogically
to the construction of efficient portfolios and pricing of risky assets in the presence of a
risk-free asset, 3 rational people incorporate the trade off between the extra satisfaction
from having unrestrained sex and the associated costs of risk bearing into their decisionmaking process and may prefer a portfolio of risky sex and risk-free sex to a corner
solution of exclusive engagement in risk-free sex. 4
An alternative, no less appealing, interpretation of the portfolio framework adopted by
this paper is to consider the population as a whole and divide it, similarly to Kremer
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(1996), into two groups: highly sexually active people and, slightly different from Kremer
(ibid), sexually conservative people. From the point of view of the society as a whole, the
first group is a risky human asset and the second is a risk-free human asset. Both assets
are engaged in the aggregate production of sexual satisfaction. At any point in time, the
expected contribution of a unit of the risky group to the instantaneous aggregate level of
sexual satisfaction exceeds the expected contribution of a unit of the risk-free group, but
at a cost of increased uncertainty about the society’s quality and expectancy of life. The
relative size of the groups evolves over time in accordance with the prevalence of AIDS
and other utilitarian, demographic and epidemiological factors. In turn, the prevalence of
the disease is affected by the relative size of these groups. In view of this interpretation,
the portfolio model developed in this paper not only incorporates, but also endogenizes,
Kremer’s (ibid) population decomposition and its cause and effect relationship with the
prevalence of AIDS.
The paper analyses the prevalence of AIDS in an uncoordinated group of people who
maximize their expected lifetime-utility from sex. In view of the adverse implications of
AIDS on life quality and duration, we refer to the members of this group as rational. 5
The analysis focuses on a representative member of this group who, like in the case of
most sub-Saharan Africans, does not know the identity of the group members infected
with AIDS as well as his, or her, own condition. The analysis of the representative
member’s sexual behavior incorporates three factors: inducement, risk and transmission.
It shows that, in addition to having risk-free sex, he, or she, may choose to be engaged in
the risky, but more satisfying, sexual activity. He, or she, might be added to the list of the
epidemic’s casualties and might also contribute to its transmission. It is shown that, under
sensible choice of the model parameter values, not much inducement is needed for a
sexually transmitted disease to reach a level of epidemic in an uncoordinated group of
rational people.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I presents the building blocks of the rational
representative member’s construction of dynamic portfolio of risk-free and risky sex. The
characteristics of his, or her, efficient-portfolio construction are summarised in section II
by a set of necessary conditions on the privately optimal allocation of time between risk-
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free and risky sexual activities over the lifespan. The implications of the representative
member’s privately optimal time allocation between risk-free and risky sexual activities
for the stationary level of the prevalence of AIDS in his, or her, group are analysed in
section III. Numerical simulations reveal the possible effects of

inducement, risk,

transmission, time preference, and life-expectancy aspects on the stationary prevalence of
the disease. Trajectories of the representative member’s intensity of risky sexual activity
and the associated prevalence of the disease in the group are displayed in a phase-plane
diagram in section IV for alternative initial conditions. While the previous sections
analyze the intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS under time-separable
preferences and fixed inducement level, section V considers the representative member’s
preference to be time-non-separable and allows his, or her, inducement level to evolve in
accordance with past intensities of risky and risk-free sexual behavior. Section VI
concludes.

I. Building blocks of the rational representative member’s sexual portfolio 6
Suppose that the representative member’s lifetime-utility function is additively separable
and that his, or her, instantaneous utility, u , increases with both risk-free and risky sexual
activities. For any given intensity, the marginal instantaneous utility from risky sex
exceeds the marginal instantaneous utility from risk-free sex. Assuming that condoms are
readily and freely available, there is no other justification for bearing the risk associated
with unrestrained sex. 7 We refer to this positive marginal instantaneous-utility
differential between risky sex and risk-free sex as the inducement factor.
Denoting the portion of the time allocated to risky sex by x ( 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ), the portion of
the time allocated to risk-free sex by 1 − x , and the relative effectiveness of risky sex by a
scalar α > 1, the utility from sex at time t is assumed to be given by

u(t ) = u(αx (t ) + (1 − x (t ))) = u(1 + (α − 1) x (t )) .

4

(1)

As suggested in the introduction, x can be alternatively interpreted as the population
share of the highly sexually active people, 1 − x as the population share of the sexually
conservative people and u the society’s instantaneous satisfaction level from sex.
Suppose further that the representative member’s rate of time preference is a nonnegative scalar ρ , that there is an upper-bound, T , on his, or her, life expectancy, and
that his, or her, probability of dying at any instant t is 0 < p(t ) < 1 for t < T . Being
aware of the uncertainty about his, or her, life expectancy that can be induced by
engagement in unrestrained sex and the prevalence of AIDS in his, or her, reference
group and aging, our expected-lifetime-utility-maximizing representative member
multiplies his, or her, accumulated utility from sex between the starting point of the
t

planning horizon, 0 , to a possible time of death t ,

∫ e − ρτ u(αx(τ ) + (1 − x(τ )))dτ , by
0

the probability of dying at that instant t ,

p(t ) . The products of

p(t ) and

t

∫ e − ρτ u(αx(τ ) + (1 − x(τ )))dτ

associated with any possible life expectancy 0 ≤ t ≤ T

0
are considered by our rational representative member. The sum of all these products is
his, or her, expected lifetime-utility from sex. It is given by the following double-integral
expression

t

 − ρτ

J = ∫ p( t )  ∫ e
u(αx (τ ) + (1 − x (τ )))dτ dt .
0

0
T

(2)

Integrating by parts, 8 our representative member’s expected lifetime-utility can be
equivalently rendered by a more manageable function

T

J = ∫ e − ρt u(αx (t ) + (1 − x (t )))Φ (t )dt
0

(3)
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where Φ is equal to 1 minus the cumulative density function associated with p and thus
indicates the probability of living beyond t .
In addition to the adverse effect of aging, our representative member’s prospects (or the
society’s prospects if x is interpreted as the population share of highly sexually active
people) of living beyond t is reduced by the interaction between his, or her, intensity of
engagement in risky sexual activity and the prevalence of AIDS in his, or her, group. We
denote the proportion of the group infected with AIDS by s ( 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 ) and refer to the
adverse effect of this interaction, xs , on our representative member’s prospects of
survival as the risk factor. Correspondingly, we specify our representative member’s
probability of living beyond t as
Φ(t ) = [1 − βx (t ) s(t )]e − µt

(4)

where µ > 0 reflects the age-effect coefficient, 9 and 0 ≤ β < 1 is the risk-factor
coefficient, which is moderated by medical care and the availability of vaccines and is
equal to zero, or almost zero, when a perfect vaccine is available.
Substituting equation (4) into equation (5), our representative member’s expected
lifetime-utility can be now expressed as

T

J = ∫ e − ( ρ + µ )t [1 − βx (t ) s(t )]u(αx (t ) + (1 − x (t )))dt .
0

(5)

In this framework, the instantaneous utility from consumption is not only discounted by
the representative member’s degree of impatience ( ρ ), but also by the risk to his, or her,
life stemming from aging and engagement in risky sex. Furthermore, by interpreting

x (t ) s(t ) as the probability of contracting AIDS at t , βx (t ) s(t ) can be alternatively
interpreted as the potential deterioration in the quality of the representative member’s life

6

stemming from AIDS and β as the expected rate of deterioration in his, or her, quality of
life.
While the proportion of the group infected with AIDS is reduced by attrition, it is
increased by the current transmission of AIDS to formerly uninfected members who are
presently engaged in risky sexual activity. Similarly to Anderson and May (1991), the net
change in the prevalence of the disease within the group is presented for tractability as:

.
s(t ) = γx (t ) − δs(t )

(6)

where 0 < γ < 1 is the AIDS-transmission coefficient and 0 < δ < 1 is the AIDS-attrition
coefficient. 10,11
The joint operation of the model’s components can be illustrated with the complacency
assertion: namely, the claim that the recently introduced drug cocktails have an adverse
effect on containing the AIDS epidemic in the technologically advanced countries where
these cocktails are available and affordable. In terms of our model, the introduction of the
drug cocktails reduces the risk-factor coefficient ( β ). This leads to a hike in the intensity
of the more satisfying, but risky, sexual activity (or to a hike in the population share of
the highly sexually active people, under the alternative interpretation of x ) and,
subsequently, to an increase in the prevalence of AIDS ( s ) above the level expected,
ceteris paribus, from the decline in the AIDS-attrition coefficient ( δ ).

II. Conditions for individually optimal portfolio of risk-free and risky sex
Our rational representative member chooses the trajectory of x that maximizes J subject
to the aforementioned motion equation of s . To simplify the mathematical analysis we
assume that his, or her, instantaneous utility function is linear in the intensities of risky
and risk-free sex:
u(t ) = αx (t ) + (1 − x (t )) = 1 + (α − 1) x (t )

(7)

7

where α − 1 is the inducement factor.
Subsequently,

T

J = ∫ e − ( ρ + µ )t [1 − βx (t ) s(t )][1 + (α − 1) x (t )]dt .
0

(8)

As J is a concave function of x , there exists an interior solution to the representative
member’s optimal-control problem. The Hamiltonian corresponding to his, or her,
problem is
H (t ) = e − ( ρ + µ )t [1 − βx (t ) s(t )][1 + (α − 1) x (t )] + λ (t )[γx (t ) − δs(t )]

(9)

where λ is a co-state variable indicating his, or her, (shadow) discontent with the
prevalence of AIDS in the group.
In addition to the motion equation (6), the solution trajectories of the representative
member’s intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS in the group should satisfy
the adjoint equation, which describes the evolution of the representative member’s
discontent with the prevalence of AIDS, 12

.
∂H
λ=−
= e − ( ρ + µ )t [ βx + (α − 1) βx 2 ] + λδ
∂s

(10)

and the optimality condition, which requires that the representative member’s satisfaction
from an infinitesimal increase in the fraction of time devoted to risky sex should
compensate for the rise in the risk of contracting AIDS and suffering from its adverse
implications for the duration and quality of life, for the forgone satisfaction from risk-free
sex and for the discontent from the subsequent rise in the prevalence of AIDS:

8

∂H
= e − ( ρ + µ )t [(α − 1 − βs) − 2(α − 1) βsx ] + λγ = 0 .
∂x

(11)

.
By substituting the right-hand-side of equation (10) for λ into the time-differential of
equation

(11)

(i.e.,

the

singular-control

equation),

and

by

recalling

that

λ = −e − ( ρ + µ )t [(α − 1 − βs) − 2(α − 1) βsx] / γ , and by rearranging terms, the noarbitrage rule of risky sex (or the population share of the highly sexually active people
under the alternative interpretation of x ) can be displayed as

.
. γ [ βx + (α − 1) βx 2 ] − ( ρ + µ + δ )[(α − 1 − βs) − 2(α − 1) βsx ]  β[1 + 2(α − 1) x ]  s
−
x=
 .(12)
2(α − 1) βs
 2(α − 1) β  s
.
Substituting the right hand side of equation (6) for s , the no-arbitrage rule can be further
expressed as

.

x=

γ [ βx + (α − 1) βx 2 ] − ( ρ + µ + δ )[(α − 1 − βs) − 2(α − 1) βsx ]  β[1 + 2(α − 1) x ](γx − δs)  −1
−
s
.(13)
2(α − 1) βs
2(α − 1) β



The implications of the no-arbitrage rule for the optimal stationary levels of the
representative member’s risky-sex intensity and prevalence of AIDS in his, or her, group
and for the possible optimal trajectories of risky-sex intensity and prevalence of AIDS off
steady state are explored in the next two sections.

III. Stationary combination of risky-sex intensity and prevalence of AIDS
By virtue of equation (6), the relationship between the stationary intensity of risky sex
( x *) and the stationary prevalence of AIDS ( s * ) is given by the ratio of the AIDSattrition coefficient to the AIDS-transmission coefficient

x* =

δ
s *.
γ

(14)
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.
.
The substitution of this relationship and the stationary condition x = 0 = s into the noarbitrage rule (12) implies that the stationary share of the population infected with AIDS
satisfies the quadratic form
1
(α − 1) βδ [2( µ + δ ) + 3ρ ]s *2 + ( ρ + µ + 2δ ) βs * − (α − 1)( ρ + µ + δ ) = 0
γ

(15)

whose feasible solution is

− ( ρ + µ + 2δ ) β + ( ρ + µ + 2δ ) 2 β 2 +
s* =

4
(α − 1) 2 βδ ( ρ + µ + δ )[2( µ + δ ) + 3ρ ]
γ

4
(α − 1) βδ [ 2( µ + δ ) + 3ρ ]
γ

. (16)

The effects of the model parameters on the stationary prevalence of AIDS indicated by
equation (16) are assessed by numerical simulations. The numerical simulations start with
the following choice of parameter values: α = 12
. (i.e., an inducement factor of 20
percent), β = 0.5 (i.e., a 50 percent deterioration in the quality of life after AIDS is
contracted), γ = 0.5 , δ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.05 . A value for the natural aging rate, µ , was
assigned by assuming that the probability of living to the age of 61.7 in an AIDS-free
environment is equal to 0.5. 13 By setting Φ in equation (4) to be equal to 0.5, t to be
equal to 61.7 and

s

to be equal to zero (i.e., AIDS-free environment),

µ = ( − ln 0.5) / 617
. = 0.011234 . As can be seen from this expression, µ declines with the
expected lifespan in an AIDS-free environment and the probability of living beyond that
age.
Substituting these parameter values into equation (16), s* = 0.2304 . By virtue of
equation (14), and as identical values for γ and δ are assigned, x* = 0.2304 . These
results indicate that even under moderate inducement factor of 20 percent and a severe
immediate deterioration in quality of life of 50 percent upon contracting AIDS, the
stationary intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS are considerably high.
The effect of each of the model parameters on the stationary level of the prevalence of
AIDS was simulated by changing its value, while holding the rest of the parameters at the
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levels indicated above. These effects are summarised in Table 1 where each line of
possible values for a specific parameter is followed by a line containing the
corresponding stationary levels of the prevalence of AIDS. The column of bold entries
indicates our initial choice of parameter values and the associated stationary prevalence of
AIDS.

TABLE 1—SIMULATED EFFECTS

OF THE

MODEL’S PARAMETERS

ON THE

STATIONARY Prevalence

OF

AIDS

α

1.025

1.05

1.10

1.15

1.20

1.30

1.50

1.75

2.00

2.66

s*
β

0.0271

0.0552

0.1135

0.1726

0.2304

0.3372

0.5081

0.6620

0.7780

1.0000

0.21

0.25

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

0.9990

0.7601

0.5644

0.3443

0.2304

0.1643

0.1228

0.0952

0.0758

0.0618

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

s*
δ

0.1813

0.2067

0.2186

0.2257

0.2304

0.2337

0.2362

0.2382

0.2397

0.2410

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

s*

0.2869

0.2586

0.2453

0.2368

0.2304

0.2252

0.2207

0.2168

0.2132

0.2100

ρ

0.00

0.01

0.025

0.04

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.30

0.50

1.00

0.2226

0.2243

0.2266

0.2289

0.2304

0.2372

0.2433

0.2579

0.2718

0.2923

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

0.95

0.2345

0.2328

0.2317

0.2310

0.2304

0.2299

0.2295

0.2291

0.2288

0.2287

s*
γ

The numerical-simulation results indicate that the stationary proportion of the group
infected with AIDS largely, but concavely, rises with the inducement factor α and
converges to one when the satisfaction from risky sex exceeds the satisfaction from riskfree sex by 166 percent. The reduction in the prevalence of AIDS generated by a one
percent improvement in the sensual quality of freely distributed condoms can be 0.855
percent when the initial satisfaction differential between risky sex and risk-free sex is 50
percent or 0.464 percent when the initial satisfaction differential is 100 percent.
Compatibly with the complacency argument, the stationary proportion of the group
infected with AIDS largely increases as the risk-factor coefficient (or the rate of expected
deterioration in the quality of life) β declines.
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The stationary proportion of the group infected with AIDS slightly rises with the AIDStransmission coefficient γ and slightly declines with the AIDS-attrition coefficient δ .
The stationary proportion of the group infected with AIDS slightly rises with the rate of
time preference ρ .
The stationary proportion of the group infected with AIDS declines very slightly as the
probability of living beyond 61.7 years (that underlining the changes in our choice of the
natural aging rate µ ) rises. As argued earlier, µ also declines with the expected lifespan
in an AIDS-free environment. Hence, this simulation result is compatible in its direction
with Philipson’s and Posner’s (1995) assertion of greater aversion towards risky sex in
societies endowed with long life expectancy (e.g., the American society) than in societies
with short life expectancy (e.g., the people of sub-Saharan Africa). However, the very
small change in s * revealed by the simulations suggests that life expectancy might not be
an important factor. People who have only 20 years to live may cherish their life no less
than people who have twice as many years to live.

IV. Phase-plane diagram of risky-sex intensity and prevalence of AIDS
The evolution of the representative member’s intensity of risky sex is displayed by the
no-arbitrage rule (13) and the change in the prevalence of AIDS in his, or her, group is
given by the motion equation (6). In view of the complexity of equation (13), the analysis
of the possible rationally optimal trajectories of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS
employs the basic set of parameters’ values used in the numerical simulations of the
stationary point. Consequently, the motion equations of the intensity of risky sex and the
prevalence of AIDS are
.
x = 2.653085 + 1061234
.
x − (0.561234 + 0.25x 2 ) s −1

(17)

.
s = 0.5x − 0.5s .

(18)

.
By setting the left-hand-side of equation (17) to be equal to zero, the isocline x = 0 is
given by

12

0.561234 + 0.25x 2
s.
=
2.653085 + 1061234
.
x
|x = 0

(19)

whose slope is negative for 0 < x < 0.41461 , equal to zero for x = 0.41461 , and positive
.
for x > 0.41461 as depicted in Figure 1. Equation (17) also reveals that ∂ x / ∂s is
.
.
positive. Hence, x is positive (negative) above (below) the isocline x = 0 as displayed by
the horizontal arrows in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Phrase-plane diagram of risky sex and AIDS
.
By virtue of equation (6) the isocline s = 0 is given by

13

γ
s.
= x.
δ
|x = 0

(20)

.
Recalling that γ and δ are set to be equal to one another, the isocline s = 0 is displayed
.
.
in Figure 1 by the 45-degree line. Recalling further that ∂ s / ∂x = γ > 0 , s is positive
(negative) below (above) the 45-degree line as illustrated by the vertical arrows.
The stationary combination of the intensity of rational individuals’ pursuance of risky
sexual activity and the prevalence of AIDS in their uncoordinated group is unique and
depicted by the intersection of the two isoclines in Figure 1. The horizontal and vertical
arrows indicate that the stationary combination is a saddle point. Only two arms converge
to this stationary point. The upper one, starting at point B, displays, despite the increase in
the intensity of risky sex, a decline in the prevalence of AIDS. This is due to the high rate
of attrition accompanying the initially very high prevalence of the disease. In contrast, the
lower convergent arm, which starts at point A, displays, despite the decline in the
intensity of risky sex, an increase in the prevalence of AIDS. This is explained by the
initial high intensity of risky sex that leads to a high rate of transmission of the disease.
The rest of the possible trajectories of risky-sex intensity and prevalence of AIDS do
not converge to the stationary combination. The trajectory starting at point C reveals that,
despite the considerable initial intensity of risky sex, the disease will be spontaneously
(i.e., without intervention) contained because of its initially low prevalence. Similarly, the
trajectory starting at point D illustrates that, despite its initial high prevalence, the disease
will be spontaneously contained because of the initial low intensity of risky sexual
activity within the group.
However, the trajectories starting at point E and F reflect that if either the initial
intensity of risky sex, or the initial prevalence of the disease, are very high, it is unlikely
that the epidemic will be spontaneously contained. In these cases, as well as in cases
where both the initial intensity of risky sex and prevalence of the disease are considerably
high, and in the absence of effective care and prevention, the epidemic will lead to the
extinction of the uncoordinated group of rational individuals.
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V. Habitual inducement and the intensity of risky sex and prevalence of AIDS
The aforementioned trajectories and the stationary combination of risky sexual activity
and prevalence of AIDS were generated under the assumption that the preferences of the
representative member are time-separable. An alternative approach is that of timenonseparable preferences, where, due to habit, the inducement parameter α is allowed to
rise with the intensity of risky sex and to decline with the intensity of risk-free sex. That
is,

.

α (t ) = α1 x (t ) − α 2 [1 − x (t )]

(21)

where α1 and α 2 are positive scalars. This specification displays a reinforcement effect
of past behavior on the current level of inducement. Historically, unrestrained sexual
activity has been dominant and even absolute, in developing regions in particular. The
incorporation of the above formula of habitual inducement into the construction of
lifetime portfolio of risk-free and risky sexual activities reveals that, following the
introduction of sex-restraining measures to a society with no former experience, the
intensity of risky sexual activity and the prevalence of AIDS will be initially larger than
those suggested in our previous fixed-inducement analysis. As time progresses, α and its
shadow value decline, and hence it is likely that beyond a critical point in time the
intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS under habitual inducement will be
lower than under fixed inducement.
In the presence of habitual inducement, the representative member’s decision problem
is maximizing J (given by equation (8)) subject to the motion equation (6) of the
prevalence of AIDS and the motion equation (21) which displays the evolution of the
inducement level. The corresponding Hamiltonian is
H (t ) = e − ( ρ + µ ) t [1 − βx ( t ) s(t )][1 + (α − 1) x (t )] + λ (t )[γx (t ) − δs(t )] + η(t ){α 1 x ( t ) − α 2 [1 − x ( t )]} (22)

where η is the shadow value of α .
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In addition to the motion equations (6) and (21), the set of necessary conditions for
maximum expected lifetime utility includes

.
∂H
λ=−
= e − ( ρ + µ )t [ βx + (α − 1) βx 2 ] + λδ
∂s

(23)

.
∂H
η=−
= −e − ( ρ + µ )t (1 − βxs) x
∂α

(24)

∂H
= e − ( ρ + µ ) t [(α − 1 − βs) − 2(α − 1) βsx ] + λγ + η(α 1 + α 2 ) = 0 .
∂x

(25)

Rearranging the terms in the optimality condition (25) it can be shown that in the
presence of habitual inducement ( HI ) the intensity of risky sex ( x HI ) at each instant is
given by

x HI =

e − ( ρ + µ ) t (α − 1 − βs) + λγ + η(α1 + α 2 )
2(α − 1) βs

(26)

whereas by rearranging the terms in the optimality condition (11) it is found that under
fixed inducement ( FI ) the intensity of risky sex ( x FI ) is given by

x FI =

e − ( ρ + µ ) t (α − 1 − βs) + λγ
.
2(α − 1) βs

(27)

Thus, starting from the same level of α , x HI − x FI is initially positive:

x HI (0) − x FI (0) =

η(0)(α1 + α 2 )
>0.
2(α − 1) βs(0)

(28)

By the adjoint equation (24), η declines over time, and α is likely to decline over time
after the introduction of precautionary measures. Hence, it is possible that beyond a
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critical point in time x HI − x FI is negative. Recalling the motion equation (6), the
prevalence of AIDS is initially larger in the presence of habitual inducement than under
fixed inducement, but later smaller.

VI. Conclusion
The paper analyzed the portfolio of risky and risk-free sexual activities and the prevalence
of AIDS within a group of rational people with a stochastic, dynamic optimisation model.
A key feature of the model was the assumption of an inducement factor: a positive
marginal instantaneous-utility differential between risky sex and risk-free sex. Another
key feature was that the probability of continuing to live diminishes with the interaction
between the individual’s intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS in his, or her,
reference group. The latter feature was interchangeably viewed as the disutility associated
with a possible deterioration in quality of life whose likelihood rises with the prevalence
of AIDS in the group and the individual’s level of involvement in risky sex. A third
feature of the model was that the prevalence of the epidemic is intensified by the intensity
of risky sexual activity and moderated by attrition. The combination of these key features
illustrates the complacency assertion as a decline in the risk-factor coefficient induced by
the new effective drug cocktails, that led to a hike in the intensity of risky, but more
satisfying, sexual activity and, subsequently, to an increase in the prevalence of AIDS
beyond the level expected from the decline in the AIDS-attrition coefficient per se.
The model showed that along the efficient trajectory of risky and risk-free portfolio the
satisfaction from an infinitesimal increase in the fraction of time devoted to risky sex
should compensate for the rise in the risk of contracting AIDS and suffering from its
adverse implications for the duration and quality of life, for the forgone satisfaction from
risk-free sex and for the discontent from the subsequent rise in the prevalence of AIDS.
The numerical-simulation results indicated that the stationary proportion of the group of
rational people infected with AIDS largely rises with the inducement factor (i.e., the
satisfaction differential between risky sex and risk-free sex) and, compatibly with the
complacency assertion, it also largely rises as the risk-factor coefficient (or the immediate
deterioration in quality of life upon contracting AIDS) declines. Even under the moderate
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assumptions of a twenty percent inducement factor and fifty percent risk factor the
stationary intensity of risky sex and the stationary prevalence of AIDS are considerably
high—twenty-three percent. What are the policy implications of these results?
During the last twenty years a large effort has been invested in developing drugs against
the AIDS virus. The existing drug cocktails do not provide a cure and immunisation.
They only slow the deterioration in the quality of life and extend the life expectancy of
those infected with AIDS. Using the model’s terminology, they reduce, but not eliminate,
the risk factor β . The achievements in drug development benefited only a small, rich
fraction of the population suffering from the disease and, perhaps, increased, considerably
in view of the numerical simulation results, the level of complacency and, subsequently,
the prevalence of the epidemic in the rich countries. The policy implications are therefore
clear. A greater attention should be paid to the satisfaction differential between risky sex
and risk-free sex and its reduction by a widely affordable method. Much more effort
should be invested in developing and widely distributing a, sensually less restraining
condoms. The development and wide distribution of such high quality condoms may
reduce the inducement factor and hence the intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of
the epidemic in both poor and rich areas. In accordance with Table 1’s simulation results,
an improvement in the quality of condoms that reduces the inducement factor from 1.2 to
1.1 may lower the stationary prevalence of AIDS by almost 51 percent from 0.2304 to
0.1135. Similarly, if the present inducement factor is much greater, an improvement in
the quality of condoms that reduces the inducement factor from 2.00 to 1.50 may lower
the stationary prevalence of AIDS by almost 35 percent from 0.7780 to 0.5081.
The numerical simulations also revealed that the stationary proportion of the group
infected with AIDS only slightly rises with the AIDS-contraction coefficient and the rate
of time preference and only slightly declines with the AIDS-attrition coefficient and that
it is almost insensitive to changes in the assumption about the probability of living
beyond the expected lifespan in an hypothetically AIDS-free developing country.
The model also suggests that the stationary combination of risky-sex intensity and the
prevalence of AIDS is a unique, saddle point. One of the two convergent arms displayed,
despite the increase in the intensity of risky sex, a decline in the prevalence of AIDS
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because of the high rate of attrition accompanying the initially very high prevalence of the
disease. The other exhibited, despite the decline in the intensity of risky sex, an increase
in the prevalence of AIDS because of the initial high intensity of risky sex that leads to a
high rate of transmission of the disease. The rest of the possible trajectories of risky-sex
intensity and prevalence of AIDS do not converge to the stationary combination. One
prototype non-convergent trajectory revealed that, despite the considerable initial
intensity of risky sex, the disease would be spontaneously contained because of its
initially low prevalence. Another non-convergent prototype trajectory illustrated that the
disease would be spontaneously contained, despite its initial high prevalence, when the
initial intensity of risky sexual activity within the group is low. Other non-convergent
trajectories reflected, however, that if either the initial intensity of risky sex, or the initial
prevalence of the disease, are very high, it is unlikely that the epidemic would be
spontaneously contained and, in the absence of effective care and prevention, the
epidemic would lead to the extinction of the uncoordinated group of rational people.
Finally, the modification of the group-members’ preferences to be time-nonseparable
and the incorporation of habitual inducement into the construction of their lifetime
portfolios of risk-free and risky sexual activities reveal that following the introduction of
sex-restraining measures to a group of rational people with no former experience with
such precautionary measures, the intensity of risky sexual activity and the prevalence of
AIDS will be initially larger than those suggested by a fixed-inducement analysis. After a
while it is likely, however, that the intensity of risky sex and the prevalence of AIDS
under habitual inducement will be lower than under fixed inducement due to the decline
of the inducement level and its shadow value.
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Endnotes
1. For a global summary of the AIDS/HIV epidemic see AIDS Epidemic Update:
December 2000, UNAIDS, www.unaids.org. For a review of the AIDS epidemic in
Africa see also Baylies (2000) and Caldwell (2000).
2. Thompson (1989) has proposed that the optimal policy differs in accordance with the
individual level of risk and argued against the prevalence of laissez fair as to the privatemarket supply of the AIDS antibody test and rules guaranteeing strict confidentiality of
the test results.
3. See Tobin’s (1958) and Sharpe’s (1964) seminal papers.
4. Some readers may object to this portfolio approach and the possibility of non-corner
solution and argue that, unlike financial asset portfolio, the risk here is to life and a
rational person will not risk his, or her, life for an extra, brief, sexual thrill. The attention
of the sceptics is drawn to the analogous behavior of drivers and to the following
questions. Have you, presumably on the road with a rational intention of getting from A
to B, never passed the speed limit or taken the more scenic, but dangerous, route? And if
you happened to have a motorcycle, have you always driven it with full-body protective
gear (especially on a hot summer day)?
5. Kremer (1996) has suggested that increased HIV risk may make people with high
sexual activity fatalistic and hence they reduce their risky sexual activity only slightly or
even increase it. This fatalistic attitude and reaction is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
6. The model was constructed independently prior to reading the economic literature on
the subject.
7. Ahituv, Hotz and Philipson (1996) have found that the use of condoms by youth in the
United States increases significantly with the prevalence of AIDS.
8. Letting the inner integral be U and p(t )dt be dV .
9. The effect of age on the prospects of survival can be alternatively presented as a
proportion of T − t . Such a representation is more compatible with the existence of an
upper-bound on life expectancy than the exponential representation used in equation (4).
However, it tremendously complicates the analysis.
10. Since s is the percentage of the population, rather than the number of people, infected
with AIDS, it is possible to assume that γ is independent of s . Alternatively, the
contraction of AIDS could be assumed to follow a shifting logistic process (S-curve) with
a contraction rate which is increasing in the intensity of risky sex but initially increasing
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.
and later decreasing in the prevalence of the epidemic: s(t ) = γ ( x (t )) s(t )[1 − s(t )] − δs(t ) ,
dγ dx > 0 . Though more realistic, this specification complicates the analysis
considerably.
11. While in Anderson and May (1991) and Kremer (1996) the transmission of the
disease is proportional to the rate of partner change, here it is proportional to the intensity
of unsafe sex, or to the population share of the highly sexually active people under the
alternative interpretation of x .
12. The time index is omitted for tractability.
13. 61.7 years is the expectation of life at birth without AIDS computed by the United
Nations Population Division, United Nations (1999), with a sample of 35 African, 4
Asian and 6 Latin-American developing countries infected with AIDS.
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